| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, he memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py. No sanitization is performed and shell metacharacters are interpreted by /bin/sh before the intended command executes. Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration. The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without further user interaction. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.128. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the Flask API endpoint in src/praisonai/api.py renders agent output as HTML without effective sanitization. The _sanitize_html function relies on the nh3 library, which is not listed as a required or optional dependency in pyproject.toml. When nh3 is absent (the default installation), the sanitizer is a no-op that returns HTML unchanged. An attacker who can influence agent input (via RAG data poisoning, web scraping results, or prompt injection) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the browser of anyone viewing the API output. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, deploy.py constructs a single comma-delimited string for the gcloud run
deploy --set-env-vars argument by directly interpolating openai_model, openai_key, and openai_base without validating that these values do not contain commas. gcloud uses a comma as the key-value pair separator for --set-env-vars. A comma in any of the three values causes gcloud to parse the trailing text as additional KEY=VALUE definitions, injecting arbitrary environment variables into the deployed Cloud Run service. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the /api/v1/runs endpoint accepts an arbitrary webhook_url in the request body with no URL validation. When a submitted job completes (success or failure), the server makes an HTTP POST request to this URL using httpx.AsyncClient. An unauthenticated attacker can use this to make the server send POST requests to arbitrary internal or external destinations, enabling SSRF against cloud metadata services, internal APIs, and other network-adjacent services. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the WSGI-based recipe registry server (server.py) reads the entire HTTP request body into memory based on the client-supplied Content-Length header with no upper bound. Combined with authentication being disabled by default (no token configured), any local process can send arbitrarily large POST requests to exhaust server memory and cause a denial of service. The Starlette-based server (serve.py) has RequestSizeLimitMiddleware with a 10MB limit, but the WSGI server lacks any equivalent protection. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the /media-stream WebSocket endpoint in PraisonAI's call module accepts connections from any client without authentication or Twilio signature validation. Each connection opens an authenticated session to OpenAI's Realtime API using the server's API key. There are no limits on concurrent connections, message rate, or message size, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust server resources and drain the victim's OpenAI API credits. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. |
| PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, read_skill_file() in skill_tools.py allows reading arbitrary files from the filesystem by accepting an unrestricted skill_path parameter. Unlike file_tools.read_file which enforces workspace boundary confinement, and unlike run_skill_script which requires critical-level approval, read_skill_file has neither protection. An agent influenced by prompt injection can exfiltrate sensitive files without triggering any approval prompt. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.128. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the _safe_extractall() function in PraisonAI's recipe registry validates archive members against path traversal attacks but performs no checks on individual member sizes, cumulative extracted size, or member count before calling tar.extractall(). An attacker can publish a malicious recipe bundle containing highly compressible data (e.g., 10GB of zeros compressing to ~10MB) that exhausts the victim's disk when pulled via LocalRegistry.pull() or HttpRegistry.pull(). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.115, the A2U (Agent-to-User) event stream server in PraisonAI exposes all agent activity without authentication. The create_a2u_routes() function registers the following endpoints with NO authentication checks: /a2u/info, /a2u/subscribe, /a2u/events/{stream_name}, /a2u/events/sub/{id}, and /a2u/health. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.115. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.121, the execute_command function and workflow shell execution are exposed to user-controlled input via agent workflows, YAML definitions, and LLM-generated tool calls, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary shell commands through shell metacharacters. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.121. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, _validate_path() calls os.path.normpath() first, which collapses .. sequences, then checks for '..' in normalized. Since .. is already collapsed, the check always passes. This makes the check completely useless and allows trivial path traversal to any file on the system. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, the Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, PraisonAI's recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled .praison tar archives with tar.extractall() and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains ../ traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected. This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, The PraisonAI templates installation feature is vulnerable to a "Zip Slip" Arbitrary File Write attack. When downloading and extracting template archives from external sources (e.g., GitHub), the application uses Python's zipfile.extractall() without verifying if the files within the archive resolve outside of the intended extraction directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, PraisonAI's recipe registry publish endpoint writes uploaded recipe bundles to a filesystem path derived from the bundle's internal manifest.json before it verifies that the manifest name and version match the HTTP route. A malicious publisher can place ../ traversal sequences in the bundle manifest and cause the registry server to create files outside the configured registry root even though the request is ultimately rejected with HTTP 400. This is an arbitrary file write / path traversal issue on the registry host. It affects deployments that expose the recipe registry publish flow. If the registry is intentionally run without a token, any network client that can reach the service can trigger it. If a token is configured, any user with publish access can still exploit it. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI treats remotely fetched template files as trusted executable code without integrity verification, origin validation, or user confirmation, enabling supply chain attacks through malicious templates. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.115, execute_code() in praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools defaults to sandbox_mode="sandbox", which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a restricted __builtins__ dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (blocked_attrs of python_tools.py) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+ names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list (__traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, and f_builtins). Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python builtins dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which exec can be retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every remaining security layer. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.115. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.115, the AgentService.loadAgentFromFile method uses the js-yaml library to parse YAML files without disabling dangerous tags (such as !!js/function and !!js/undefined). This allows an attacker to craft a malicious YAML file that, when parsed, executes arbitrary JavaScript code. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by uploading a malicious agent definition file via the API endpoint, leading to remote code execution (RCE) on the server. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.115. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.15 to before version 4.5.69, the --mcp CLI argument is passed directly to shlex.split() and forwarded through the call chain to anyio.open_process() with no validation, allowlist check, or sanitization at any hop, allowing arbitrary OS command execution as the process user. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.69. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.90, the get_all_user_threads function constructs raw SQL queries using f-strings with unescaped thread IDs fetched from the database. An attacker stores a malicious thread ID via update_thread. When the application loads the thread list, the injected payload executes and grants full database access. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.90. |
